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It is commonly assumed that people make intertemporal choices by “discounting” the value of delayed
outcomes, assigning discounted values independently to all options, and comparing the discounted
values. We identify a class of anomalies to this assumption of alternative-based discounting, which
collectively shows that options are not treated independently but rather comparatively: The time
difference, or interval, between the options sometimes counts more and sometimes counts less if it is
taken as a whole than if it is divided into shorter subintervals (superadditivity and subadditivity,
respectively), and whether the interval counts more or less depends on the money difference, or
compensation, involved (inseparability). We develop a model that replaces alternative-based discounting
with attribute-based tradeoffs. In our model, people make intertemporal choices by weighing how much
more they will receive or pay if they wait longer against how much longer the wait will be, or, conversely,
how much less they will receive or pay if they do not wait longer against how much shorter the wait will
be. This model, called the tradeoff model, accommodates, in a psychologically plausible way, all
anomalies that the discounting approach can and cannot address.
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Intertemporal choices involve tradeoffs between costs and ben-
efits that occur at different points in time (Loewenstein & Elster,
1992; Loewenstein, Read, & Baumeister, 2003). These include
choices such as taking a job now or getting an education and
having a chance at a better job later, and spending money now or
saving it and having more to spend later. Most intensively inves-
tigated, however, are much more elementary choices between
smaller-sooner and larger-later amounts of money, such as receiv-
ing $100 now or $150 in 3 months. It is commonly assumed that
people make intertemporal choices by “discounting” the value of
delayed outcomes, assigning discounted values to the options, and
then comparing these discounted values. For this choice, they
would compare the value of $100 now with the discounted value
of $150 in 3 months. We argue that this does not accurately
describe the psychology of intertemporal tradeoffs.
Discounting models belong to the broad class of alternative-
based choice models, in which the options are independently
assigned an overall value, these values are compared, and the
option with the highest value is chosen. Alternative-based choice
models can be contrasted with attribute-based ones (Payne, Bett-
man, & Johnson, 1988), in which the options are directly compared
along their attributes, and the option favored by these comparisons
is chosen.1 Alternative-based discounting models can accommo-
date much of what we know about intertemporal choice, but there
remains evidence, reviewed and strengthened in this article, that
can only be addressed by an attribute-based choice model. In this
article, we develop such a model, called the tradeoff model. Our
model accommodates, in a psychologically plausible way, all
anomalies that discounting models can and cannot address.
We begin with a review of discounting models and the evidence
they can explain. We then identify three anomalies to discounting
theory. Given these anomalies, we develop the tradeoff model and
show how it accommodates all the evidence, whether consistent or
inconsistent with discounting theory. After this largely qualitative
development, we provide a fully parametric specification of the
tradeoff model. We conclude by discussing how the tradeoff model
deals with additional evidence and how it improves on related
theories of choice.
1 Analogous distinctions have been made between independent and
component-wise evaluation (Tversky, 1969), interdimensional and intradi-
mensional processing (Payne, 1976), holistic and dimensional choice strat-
egies (Russo & Dosher, 1983), and separate and joint evaluation (Hsee,
Loewenstein, Blount, & Bazerman, 1999).
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Discounting Theory and Anomalies in
Intertemporal Choice
We focus on intertemporal choices between pairs of single dated
outcomes, one smaller-but-sooner (SS), the other larger-but-later
(LL). An example is the choice between $100 in 1 month and $150
in 4 months. The outcomes are designated as xS and xL ($100 and
$150), and their respective delays as tS and tL (1 and 4 months). We
first describe how an elementary choice such as this is addressed
by the discounted utility model, the normative standard for inter-
temporal choice, and then we discuss how successive reformula-
tions of discounting theory have addressed preference patterns
anomalous to this normative standard.
Delay Discounting Model 1: Samuelson’s (1937)
Discounted Utility Model
In this model, intertemporal preferences are governed by the
discounted utilities of the options. Discounted utilities are deter-
mined by first integrating the outcomes of choice with the baseline
consumption level, assigning utilities to the consumption levels
resulting from this asset integration, and then exponentially dis-
counting these utilities as a function of the delays to the outcomes.
Formally, the discounted utilities of SS and LL are given as
US tS uc xS  
tL uc,
UL tS uc  tL uc xL,
where 0    1 is an exponential discounting parameter, c is a
constant baseline consumption level, and u is a concave utility
function over consumption levels. The decision maker will be
indifferent between SS and LL when
 tLtS
uc xS  uc
uc xL  uc
. (1)
For elementary choices between SS and LL, the normative status
of the discounted utility model derives largely from two of its
features (for a more complete discussion, see Frederick, Loewen-
stein, & O’Donoghue, 2002): exponential discounting and asset
integration. Exponential discounting ensures consistency in the
treatment of time so that intertemporal preferences will not change
merely because time has passed (Strotz, 1955–1956). The prefer-
ence between two outcomes separated by a 3-month interval, for
instance, should be the same regardless of whether the interval
begins now, in 1 month, or in 9 months. Asset integration ensures
consistency in the treatment of money. For instance, someone who
prefers $150 in 4 months to $100 in 1 month should, in two
separate choices between $75 in 4 months and $50 in 1 month,
consistently prefer the former over the latter (see Prelec & Loe-
wenstein, 1991).
Delay Discounting Model 2: Laibson’s (1997)
Quasi-Hyperbolic Discounting Model
In this model, indifference between SS and LL is given by
Equation 1 when both outcomes are delayed but not when SS is a
smaller-immediate outcome. This is because a single “jolt” of
discounting is added to the exponential discounting of delayed
utilities:
US uc xS  tL uc,
UL uc  tL uc xL,
where 0    1 is a quasi-hyperbolic discounting parameter.
Thus, the decision maker will be indifferent between SS and LL
when
 tL
uc xS  uc
uc xL  uc
. (2)
The implication of Equations 1 and 2 is the immediacy effect
(Keren & Roelofsma, 1995; Read, Loewenstein, & Kalyanaraman,
1999; B. J. Weber & Chapman, 2005), also called present-biased
preference (O’Donoghue & Rabin, 1999): There is more discount-
ing over an interval that begins now than one that begins later. For
instance, someone who is indifferent between $150 in 3 months
and $100 now will prefer $150 in 4 months to $100 in 1 month.
Delay Discounting Model 3: Loewenstein and Prelec’s
(1992) Hyperbolic Discounting Model
This model drops the assumptions of exponential discounting
and asset integration. In this model, preferences are governed by
the discounted values of the options. Discounted values are deter-
mined by first assigning values to changes in consumption level
and then by hyperbolically discounting these values as a function
of the delay to the outcomes. Formally, the discounted values of SS
and LL are then given as
VS i1tS ivxS,
VL i1tL ivxL,
where v is a value function over changes in consumption level. For
each time unit, i, there is a hyperbolic discounting parameter, 0 
i  1, which increases with i. At the indifference point,
 itS1tL i vxSvxL.
Hyperbolic discounting is motivated by the common difference
effect (Loewenstein & Prelec, 1992): There is more discounting
over an interval that begins earlier than one that begins later.2 For
instance, someone who is indifferent between $150 in 4 months
and $100 in 1 month will prefer $150 in 12 months to $100 in 9
2 Not counting the studies in which the effect of the delay to the later
outcome is confounded with that of the interval between the outcomes (see
Read, 2001), the common difference effect is seen in some (Green, Fristoe, &
Myerson, 1994; Green, Myerson, & Macaux, 2005; Holt, Green, Myerson, &
Estle, 2008; Keren & Roelofsma, 1995; Kirby & Herrnstein, 1995; Scholten &
Read, 2006) but not, or not reliably, in others (Ahlbrecht & Weber, 1997;
Baron, 2000; Holcomb & Nelson, 1992; Read, 2001; Read & Roelofsma,
2003). The common difference effect has been confirmed mostly in studies in
which time periods were presented as delays proper (e.g., “in 1 year”) and
disconfirmed mostly in studies in which time periods were presented as dates
(e.g., “on December 1, 2007”). Recent studies show that using dates instead of
delays indeed attenuates or eliminates the common difference effect (LeBoeuf,
2006; Read, Frederick, Orsel, & Rahman, 2005).
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months. The common difference effect reduces to the immediacy
effect when the earlier interval begins now.
Loewenstein and Prelec (1992) proposed a specific discount
function to describe how i increases with i, and they also specified
the properties of the value function v. Three of these value function
properties are taken from prospect theory (Kahneman & Tversky,
1979). First, reference dependence, which is that outcomes are
evaluated as gains and losses relative to a neutral reference point.
These gains and losses are the changes in consumption level
mentioned earlier. The neutral reference point usually corresponds
to the baseline consumption level, in which case values are as-
signed to the outcomes as such. Second, diminishing sensitivity,
which is that the marginal impact of an outcome decreases with the
magnitude of the outcome (i.e., v is concave over gains and convex
over losses). Third, loss aversion, which is that losses loom larger
than gains (i.e., v is steeper for losses than for gains).3
Loewenstein and Prelec (1992) invoke both reference depen-
dence and loss aversion to explain the delay-speedup asymmetry,
which is that a positive outcome is discounted more, and a negative
outcome discounted less, when it is delayed than when it is sped up
over the same interval (Benzion, Rapoport, & Yagil, 1989; Shel-
ley, 1993; see also Loewenstein, 1988, Experiment 3; Malkoc &
Zauberman, 2006; E. U. Weber et al., 2007).4 The intuition un-
derlying this asymmetry can be conveyed by a thought experiment.
Imagine you expect a parcel to be delivered today, but you learn it
will be delayed for 1 week. How much would you need to be paid
to compensate you for the pain of a late delivery? Call that amount
C. Now imagine you expect a parcel to be delivered in 1 week, but
you learn it can be sped up for delivery today. How much would
you be willing to pay for the pleasure of an early delivery? Call
that amount c. The delay-speedup asymmetry is that C is greater
than c. Over the same interval, you will need more compensation
for the pain of a late delivery than you will be willing to pay for
the pleasure of an early one.
Loewenstein and Prelec’s (1992) explanation of the delay-
speedup asymmetry is as follows. People adapt to expected out-
comes, so that the reference point for a given moment includes
everything they expect to gain or lose at that moment. Receiving
an amount when expected has, therefore, neutral value, because it
has already been adapted to. For the same reason, however, not
receiving the amount is a loss, which must be compensated by a
gain at another moment. Specifically, when delaying a receipt, the
earlier loss has to be compensated by a later gain. Aversion to the
earlier loss drives up the magnitude of the compensating gain,
leading to more discounting. Conversely, when speeding up a
receipt over the same interval, the later loss has to be compensated
by an earlier gain. Aversion to the later loss drives up the magni-
tude of the compensating gain, leading to less discounting.
Loewenstein and Prelec (1992) proposed that the value function
has two properties in addition to those adopted from prospect
theory. The first is that increasing the magnitude of both outcomes
by the same multiplicative constant decreases the ratio between the
values of xS and xL:
vmxS
vmxL

vxS
vxL
iff m 	 1.5 (3)
This property is motivated by the absolute magnitude effect (Loe-
wenstein & Prelec, 1992; for a first demonstration, see Thaler,
1981): The discounting over an interval is inversely related to
outcome magnitude. For instance, someone who is indifferent
between $150 in 4 months and $100 in 1 month will prefer $1,500
in 4 months to $1,000 in 1 month. This is probably the most robust
anomaly in intertemporal choice.6
The final property of Loewenstein and Prelec’s (1992) value
function is that reversing the sign of the outcomes from positive to
negative decreases the ratio between the values of xS and xL:
vxS
vxL

vxS
vxL
iff xS, xL 	 0. (4)
This property is motivated by the gain-loss asymmetry (Loewen-
stein & Prelec, 1992): There is less discounting over a given
interval when the outcomes are losses than when they are gains.7
For instance, someone who is indifferent between receiving $100
in 1 month and receiving $150 in 4 months will prefer to pay $100
in 1 month rather than pay $150 in 4 months.
In sum, Loewenstein and Prelec’s (1992) hyperbolic discounting
model can accommodate several anomalies to the discounted util-
ity model. There are, however, anomalies to discounting theory
itself. These are identified in the next section.
Why Discounting Does Not Work
In this section, we identify three anomalies to discounting the-
ory. The first two rule out the alternative-based delay discounting
models discussed in the previous section but not necessarily the
“hybrid” (partly-alternative-partly-attribute-based) interval dis-
counting model that we proposed recently (Scholten & Read,
2006) and that we discuss first. The third anomaly, however, rules
out even this hybrid interval discounting model, which is our
motivation for developing a fully attribute-based tradeoff model of
intertemporal choice.
3 Hyperbolic discounting captures diminishing sensitivity to delays (see
Scholten & Read, 2006, Footnote 4; see also Takanishi, 2005).
4 Given that this anomaly, like others below, is ascribed to the value
function and not to the discount function, the term discounting loses its
strict association with the discount function: It merely serves to describe an
empirical regularity.
5 The article by Loewenstein and Prelec (1992) contains a typographical
error, in that their Inequality 18 reads “” instead of “	”.
6 The studies by Kirby and Marakovic´ (1995) are perhaps the only
studies with humans in which the absolute magnitude effect was not
corroborated. In animal studies, it has not been corroborated either (e.g.,
Grace, 1999; Green, Myerson, Holt, Slevin, & Estle, 2004; Ong & White,
2004; Richards, Mitchell, de Wit, & Seiden, 1997).
7 Not counting the studies in which the effect of the sign of an outcome
is confounded with that of delaying or speeding up an outcome (see
Shelley, 1993), the gain-loss asymmetry is seen in some (Murphy, Vuch-
inich, & Simpson, 2001; Yates & Watts, 1975) but not, or not reliably, in
others (Ahlbrecht & Weber, 1997; Benzion et al., 1989; Loewenstein,
1988; Shelley, 1993). The delay-speedup asymmetry is essentially a gain-
loss asymmetry for compensations rather than outcomes: There is less
discounting over a given interval when a compensation is to be paid (for
speeding up a gain or delaying a loss) than when a compensation is to be
received (for delaying a gain or speeding up a loss).
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Scholten and Read’s (2006) Interval
Discounting Model
Delay discounting models hold that the utility or value of an
outcome is discounted as a function of its delay only. This is
incompatible with evidence of nonadditive discounting, which
implies that utilities or values are discounted not only as a function
of the delays to the outcomes but also as a function of the interval
between them. To illustrate, suppose that two outcomes are sepa-
rated by a single day, and we use two different procedures for
assessing the discounting over that day. In one procedure, we
obtain a single measure of the discounting that takes place over the
whole day. In the other, we obtain separate measures of the
discounting that takes place over the four day segments (morning,
afternoon, evening, and night), and then combine them into a
single measure. Discounting is additive when the two procedures
yield the same result. This is predicted by delay discounting
models. On the other hand, discounting is subadditive when there
is less discounting over the whole day than over its four segments,
and it is superadditive when there is more discounting over the
whole day than over the segments. There is evidence of both
subadditive and superadditive discounting, as discussed below.
In the interval discounting model, discounting is governed by
both intervals and delays. Let tL  tS be a unit interval and n be the
number of equal-length intervals into which this unit interval is
divided. According to the model, the decision maker will be
indifferent between SS and LL when
n 
vxS
vxL
,
where v is the same value function as in the hyperbolic discounting
model, and
n
n   i1n i,
which is the average discounting over the subintervals. Under
exponential discounting, i  , under quasi-hyperbolic discount-
ing, 1   and i 	 1  , and under hyperbolic discounting, i
increases with i, but, in each case, n is independent of n, which
means that discounting is additive over partitions of the interval
tL  tS. Discounting is subadditive, however, when n decreases
with n (more discounting over partitions) and superadditive when
n increases with n (less discounting over partitions).
The assumption of additive discounting has been undermined by
a series of recent studies (Kinari, Ohtake, & Tsutsui, 2009; Read,
2001; Read & Roelofsma, 2003; Scholten & Read, 2006; Zauber-
man, Kim, Malkoc, & Bettman, 2009). The pattern that emerges
from these studies is that n decreases with n (subadditivity) up to
a point, beyond which it increases with n (superadditivity). We
proposed a specific discount function to describe how i increases
with i (hyperbolic discounting) and how n first decreases and
then increases with n (Scholten & Read, 2006). That discount
function introduces a big change to discounting theory: It is not
defined over delays, t, but rather over differences between
weighted delays, that is, w(tL)  w(tS), where w is a time-weighing
function. The discount function thus incorporates direct compari-
sons along the time attribute.8
As a preliminary, we next discuss three anomalies to discount-
ing theory. The first two show that subadditivity or superadditivity
can outweigh hyperbolic or exponential discounting and diminish-
ing or constant sensitivity to outcomes. This rules out delay dis-
counting models but not necessarily the interval discounting
model, because it incorporates direct comparisons between delays
into the discount function. The third anomaly, however, shows
that, over a given range of intervals, superadditivity in intervals
can change into superadditivity in compensations when the com-
pensations change from large to small. This rules out even the
interval discounting model, because it implies that an accurate
model of intertemporal choice must incorporate direct compari-
sons between outcomes as well. Collectively, the anomalies de-
mand a fully attribute-based tradeoff model of intertemporal
choice. We now discuss the anomalies one by one.
Anomaly 1: Strong Subadditivity
We verified the first anomaly to discounting theory in a web-
administered survey administered to 196 participants. All partici-
pants made eight choices, including the following:
A  $100 in 19 months or B  $118 in 22 months;
C  $100 in 16 months or D  $136 in 22 months.
Each choice was between (a, t  k) and (a  kb, t), where the first
element of each option is money and the second element is time. The
options were obtained by setting a  $100, b  $18, t  22, and k 
1 for A–B, and k  2 for C–D. This is illustrated in Figure 1.
Table 1 gives the results. In the choice between A and B, a
majority (60%) preferred SS to LL. Among the 34% who had a
different preference between C and D, a majority (82%) shifted
from SS to LL, so that a majority (62%) now preferred LL to SS. (A
similar result was obtained by Rubinstein, 2003, Experiment 1.)
This choice pattern is incompatible with hyperbolic discounting
and diminishing sensitivity to outcomes, as we show next. (More
generally, as we prove in Appendix A, it is incompatible with
hyperbolic or exponential discounting and diminishing or constant
sensitivity to outcomes.)
Consider a person who prefers A to B, or (a, t  1) to (a  b,
t). For this person, (a, t  2) should be preferred to (a  b, t  1),
because, by hyperbolic discounting, t1  t. In addition, (a 
b, t  1) should be preferred to (a  2b, t), because, by dimin-
ishing sensitivity to outcomes, v(a  2b)  v(a  b)  v(a  b) 
v(a). By transitivity, therefore, (a, t  2) should be preferred to
(a  2b, t), or C should be preferred to D, contrary to our
observation. We call the observed choice pattern strong subaddi-
tivity, because 1 interval of k periods counts less than k intervals of
1 period, and this interval effect is strong enough to outweigh the
countervailing effects of hyperbolic discounting and diminishing
sensitivity to outcomes.
Table 2 shows strong subadditivity for four pairs of choices. The
pair on the left is between the shorter interval options (k  1), and
the one on the right is between the longer interval options (k  2).
8 Killeen (2009) suggested that the interval discounting model needs to
adjust the parameters of the discount function to accommodate the absolute
magnitude effect. However, the interval discounting model adopts the
value function from Loewenstein and Prelec (1992), which captures the
absolute magnitude effect with the property in Inequality 3.
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In each case, there is a significant shift in preference from SS to LL
as k increases.
Table 2 also shows the absolute magnitude effect: The propor-
tion of SS choices increases as we move down the rows, from
larger to smaller outcomes. As mentioned earlier, the absolute
magnitude effect is probably the most robust anomaly in intertem-
poral choice. It may therefore serve as a benchmark against which
to evaluate the size of the interval effect (strong subadditivity).
Averaged across all 12 possible comparisons between intervals of
equal length, the proportion of preference shifts due to outcome
magnitude was .25, and the difference between the proportion of
SS choices for smaller amounts and larger ones was .19. (Most of
the absolute magnitude effect was located in the contrast between
$250, on the one hand, and $100, $50, and $25, on the other; see
Table 2.) In contrast, averaged across all four comparisons be-
tween sooner outcomes of equal magnitude, the proportion of
preference shifts due to interval length was .28, and the difference
between the proportion of SS choices for shorter intervals and
longer ones was .19. The interval effect, therefore, was as large as
the absolute magnitude effect. Moreover, the interval effect out-
weighed the countervailing effects of hyperbolic or exponential
discounting and diminishing or constant sensitivity to outcomes.
No such burden was placed on the absolute magnitude effect.
Anomaly 2: Strong Superadditivity
We verified the second anomaly to discounting theory in an-
other web-administered survey administered to a further 233 par-
ticipants. They made each of the following choices:
A  $8,250 in 12 months or B  $10,250 in 24 months;
C  $6,250 in 12 months or D  $10,250 in 36 months;
E  $4,250 in 12 months or F  $10,250 in 48 months.
Each choice was between (a  kb, t) and (a, t  k). The specific
options were obtained by setting a  $10,250, b  $2,000, t  12,
and k  1 for A–B, k  2 for C–D, and k  3 for E–F. This is
illustrated in Figure 2.
Table 3 gives the results. In the choice between A and B, a
majority (60%) preferred LL to SS. Among the 38% who had a
different preference between C and D, a majority (66%) shifted
from LL to SS, so that a majority (52%) now preferred SS to LL.
Similarly, among the 23% who had a different preference between
E and F, a majority (76%) shifted from LL to SS, so that a majority
(52%) now preferred SS to LL. This choice pattern is incompatible
with hyperbolic discounting and diminishing sensitivity to out-
comes, as we show next.
Consider a person who prefers B to A, or (a, t  1) to (a  b,
t). For this person, (a, t  2) should be preferred to (a  b, t  1),
because, by hyperbolic discounting, t  2  t  1. In addition,
(a  b, t  1) should be preferred to (a  2b, t), because, by
diminishing sensitivity to outcomes, v(a  b)  v(a  2b) 	
v(a)  v(a  b). By transitivity, therefore, (a, t  2) should be
preferred to (a  2b, t), or D should be preferred to C, contrary to
our observation. We call this anomaly to discounting theory strong
superadditivity, because 1 interval of k periods counts more than k
intervals of 1 period, and this interval effect is strong enough to
outweigh the countervailing effects of hyperbolic discounting and
diminishing sensitivity to outcomes.
Anomaly 3: Inseparability
The third anomaly is that people do not treat time independently
from money: A given interval may be treated as long or short,
depending on whether the compensation is small or large. Indirect
evidence of this interdependence effect comes from two studies of
intransitive intertemporal choice.
In one study (Roelofsma & Read, 2000), small amounts of Dfl
7, 8, 9, and 10 (Dutch Guilders, before the Euro) could be earned
by waiting 1, 2, 4, and 7 weeks, respectively. In the other study
(Scholten & Read, 2006, Experiment 1), large amounts of £500,
525, 550, and 575 could be earned by waiting 1, 2, 3, and 4 weeks,
respectively. Thus, across the studies, the waiting periods were
similar but the amounts to be earned were not. The results are as
follows: In the small-amounts study, the most common intransi-
tivity was subadditivity (choice of SS from adjacent pairs but
choice of LL from more distant pairs), whereas, in the large-
amount study, the most common intransitivity was superadditivity
 
 
a a+b 
t-1 t 
a a+2b 
t-2 t t-1
a+b
$100 $118 
19 mo. 22 mo. 
$100 $136 
16 mo. 22 mo. 19 mo.
$118
Figure 1. Strong subadditivity: The countervailing effects of hyperbolic
discounting and diminishing sensitivity to outcomes (a and b are units of
money, t is time).
Table 1
Strong Subadditivity
Choice over long interval CD
Choice over short
interval AB
SS LL
SS 63 55 118
LL 12 67 79
75 122 197

2(1)  7.72, p  .01a

2(1)  27.60, p  .00b

2(1)  11.21, p  .00c
a Chi-square test on of the right-hand margin. b McNemar’s chi-square
test on the off-diagonals. c Chi-square test on the lower margin.
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(choice of LL from adjacent pairs but choice of SS from more
distant pairs).
Our interpretation of the above results is that people underweigh
small differences between adjacent options in comparison with
larger differences between more distant options and that what
counts as a small difference along one attribute depends on the
difference along the other attribute. In the large-amount study,
participants treated time differences between adjacent options as
small, yielding superadditivity in intervals. In the small-amount
study, however, participants treated money differences between
adjacent options as small, yielding superadditivity in compensa-
tions, or subadditivity in intervals. We next report direct evidence
of this interdependence effect.
We conducted a web-administered survey study with 205 partici-
pants. We created two experimental conditions, shown in Table 4. In
both conditions, different amounts could be earned by waiting 1, 2, 3,
or 4 weeks (corresponding to options A, B, C, and D, respectively). In
one condition, the amounts were large, and in the other they were
small, but in constant proportion. As shown in Table 4, each condition
included all six possible pairwise choices between the four options.
Given six pairwise choices between four options, there are 64
possible choice patterns. These can be classified by two attributes:
Presence or absence of superadditivity, and presence or absence of
subadditivity. (For ease of exposition, these terms refer to superad-
ditivity and subadditivity in intervals.) The combination of these
attributes yields four classes of choice patterns: superadditive (16),
subadditive (16), both superadditive and subadditive (8), and nei-
ther superadditive nor subadditive (24; these are all the transitive
choice patterns). An example from each class is shown in Table 5.
Superadditivity occurs when LL is chosen over adjacent intervals
but SS is chosen over the whole interval. In the first example, choice
is superadditive (AB and BC vs. AC; AB and BD vs. AD; AB, BC, and
CD vs. AD). Subadditivity occurs when SS is chosen over adjacent
intervals but LL is chosen over the whole interval. In the second
example, choice is subadditive (AC and CD vs. AD; BC and CD vs.
BD; AB, BC, and CD vs. AD). The third example shows a choice
pattern that is both superadditive (BC and CD vs. BD) and subadditive
(AB and BD vs. AD). The final example shows a transitive choice
pattern. Choice patterns were classified by superadditivity and subad-
ditivity within each experimental condition.
We want to show that intervals are treated as short with large
amounts, thus increasing the likelihood of superadditivity, and
Table 2
Strong Subadditivity and the Absolute Magnitude Effect
Option pair A–B PSS Option pair C–D PSS PSS3LL PLL3SS 
2(1)a p
$250 in 19 months or .29 $250 in 16 months or .13 .19 .04 20.45 .00
$295 in 22 months. $340 in 22 months.
$100 in 19 months or .60 $100 in 16 months or .38 .28 .06 27.60 .00
$118 in 22 months. $136 in 22 months.
$50 in 19 months or .62 $50 in 16 months or .44 .22 .04 25.92 .00
$59 in 22 months. $68 in 22 months.
$25.00 in 19 months or .68 $25 in 16 months or .47 .25 .04 31.50 .00
$29.50 in 22 months. $34 in 22 months.
Note. N  196.
a McNemar’s chi-square test of correlated proportions.
a-b 
t 
a 
t+1 
a-2b 
t 
a-b 
t+1 
a
t+2
a-3b 
t 
a-2b 
t+1 
a-b
t+2
a
t+3
$8,250 
12 mo. 
$10,250 
24 mo. 
$6,250 
12 mo. 
$8,250 
24 mo. 
$10,250
36 mo.
$4,250 
12 mo. 
$6,250 
24 mo. 
$8,250
36 mo.
$10,250
48 mo.
Figure 2. Strong superadditivity: The countervailing effects of hyper-
bolic discounting and diminishing sensitivity to outcomes (a and b are units
of money, t is time).
Table 3
Strong Superadditivity
Choice over long
interval CD
Choice over long
interval EF
Choice over short
interval AB
SS LL SS LL
SS 63 30 93 SS 80 13 93
LL 59 81 140 LL 41 99 140
122 111 233 121 112 233

2(1)  9.48, p  .00a

2(1)  9.45, p  .00b 
2(1)  14.52, p  .00b

2(1)  0.52, p  .47c 
2(1)  0.35, p  .56c
a Chi-square test on of the right-hand margin. b McNemar’s chi-square
test on the off-diagonals. c Chi-square test on the lower margin.
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treated as long with small amounts, thus increasing the likelihood
of subadditivity. One way to test this interdependence effect is by
comparing the two experimental conditions (small amounts and
large amounts) with respect to each variant of intransitivity (su-
peradditivity and subadditivity). This is done in the top left and
bottom right cross-tabulations of Table 6. As expected, superad-
ditivity was more likely with large amounts, whereas subadditivity
was more likely with small amounts. Another way to test the
interdependence effect is by comparing the two variants of intran-
sitivity within each experimental condition. This is done in the top
right and bottom left cross-tabulations of Table 6. As expected,
superadditivity was more likely with large amounts, whereas
subadditivity was more likely with small amounts. In sum, we
obtain evidence of a new anomaly to discounting theory, which we
call inseparability.
We also obtained evidence for the absolute magnitude effect.
Averaged across all six comparisons between intervals of equal
length, the proportion of preference shifts due to outcome magni-
tude was .43, and the difference between the proportions of SS
choices for small amounts and large ones was .38. In contrast,
averaged across all four comparisons testing the interdependence
effect (inseparability), the proportion of preference shifts was .23,
and the difference between the proportions in the “Yes” categories
of Table 6 was .08. Thus, the interdependence effect was modest
in comparison with the absolute magnitude effect. This does not
imply, however, that it is less important for uncovering the psy-
chological process driving these effects.
Conclusion
Both past evidence and Anomalies 1 and 2 show that people
make direct comparisons along the time attribute. The solution of
the interval discounting model is to introduce these comparisons
into the discount function. However, the discount function still
weighs the values of the outcomes independently of one another,
as in any other discounting model. Therefore, the options are
directly compared along the time attribute but not along the money
attribute. Although the interval discounting model is not unique in
combining alternative-wise valuation with attribute-wise compar-
isons (e.g., Mellers & Biagini, 1994; Shafir, Osherson, & Smith,
1993), it is unique in proposing that direct comparisons are made
along one attribute (time) but not along the other (money). This
seems psychologically implausible: If people make direct compar-
isons along the time attribute, why would they not make direct
comparisons along the money attribute as well? Anomaly 3 shows
that they do. This motivates a drastic departure from discounting
and its alternative-based approach to intertemporal choice. We
take an attribute-based approach, in which differences along the
time attribute are directly weighted against differences along the
money attribute. This enables us to accommodate all anomalies,
those that discounting theory can address and those it cannot.
Tradeoffs Without Discounting
We present two versions of the tradeoff model. In the single
reference point model, both outcomes are evaluated relative to the
Table 5
Classification of Choice Patterns: Four Examples
Superadditivity Subadditivity Both Neither
Option Option Option Option
Option B C D Option B C D Option B C D Option B C D
A LL SS SS A SS SS LL A SS SS LL A SS SS LL
B LL LL B SS LL B LL SS B SS LL
C LL C SS C LL C LL
Note. Looking at option pairs spanning adjacent intervals (e.g., AB and BD) and the option pair spanning the whole interval (e.g., AD), intransitivity occurs
when the choice for the whole interval differs from the choices for all adjacent intervals. Specifically, superadditivity occurs when LL is chosen over all
adjacent intervals but SS is chosen over the whole interval; subadditivity occurs when the reverse is true.
Table 4
Six Option Pairs With Small Outcomes and Six Option Pairs With Large Outcomes
Small outcomes Large outcomes
SS LL SS LL
A  $26.40 in 1 week B  $27.70 in 2 weeks A  $510.00 in 1 week B  $535.50 in 2 weeks
B  $27.70 in 2 weeks C  $29.10 in 3 weeks B  $535.50 in 2 weeks C  $562.30 in 3 weeks
C  $29.10 in 3 weeks D  $30.60 in 4 weeks C  $562.30 in 3 weeks D  $590.40 in 4 weeks
A  $26.40 in 1 week C  $29.10 in 3 weeks A  $510.00 in 1 week C  $562.30 in 3 weeks
B  $27.70 in 2 weeks D  $30.60 in 4 weeks B  $535.50 in 2 weeks D  $590.40 in 4 weeks
A  $26.40 in 1 week D  $30.60 in 4 weeks A  $510.00 in 1 week D  $590.40 in 4 weeks
Note. To obtain the small outcomes, we divided the large outcomes by 19.30 and rounded to the nearest $0.10.
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same reference point, the baseline consumption level. This model
accommodates all preference patterns but the delay-speedup asym-
metry. In the multiple reference point model, the outcome expected
at a given time is evaluated relative to a reference point that has
moved away from the baseline consumption level. This model
accommodates the delay-speedup asymmetry as well. The single
reference point model is a special case of the multiple reference
point model, but, for simplicity of exposition, we present them
separately.
The Single Reference Point Model
In the tradeoff model, intertemporal choices are made by di-
rectly weighing time differences against money differences. For a
choice between a smaller-sooner outcome and a larger-later one,
f 	 0 denotes the “advantage” (Tversky, 1969, p. 41) that the
smaller-sooner gain or the larger-later loss has along the time
attribute, and g 	 0 denotes the advantage that the larger-later gain
or the smaller-sooner loss has along the money attribute. The
decision maker will prefer the larger-later gain or the smaller-
sooner loss if f  g, will prefer the smaller-sooner gain or the
larger-later loss if f 	 g, and will be indifferent otherwise.
The advantages f and g are weighted time differences and
money differences. The weighing is done by two intra- and two
inter-attribute weighing functions. The two intra-attribute weigh-
ing functions are a time-weighing function w, which weighs delays
against one another, and a value function v, which weighs out-
comes against one another. The two inter-attribute weighing func-
tion are tradeoff functions QT|X and QX|T, which weigh the abso-
lute difference between weighted delays, called the effective
interval and denoted T, against the absolute difference between
valued outcomes, called the effective compensation and denoted X.
Effective differences are neither subjective nor objective: They are
weights put on time and money differences in the decision making
process. Described in terms of v, w, QT|X, and QX|T, the decision
maker will be indifferent between SS and LL when
QT XwtL  wtS  QXT vxL  vxS if xL xS 0,QXT vxS  vxL if 0  xS xL.
(5)
The two intra-attribute weighing functions are increasing; the two
inter-attribute weighing functions are nondecreasing. We next
discuss additional properties of these functions.
Reference dependence. Both intra-attribute weighing func-
tions, v and w, are reference dependent, which places the tradeoff
model in the broader class of reference-dependent choice models
(e.g., Ko¨szegi & Rabin, 2006; Tversky & Kahneman, 1991).
Delays are treated as positive deviations from the present, and, in
the single reference point model, outcomes are treated as positive
or negative deviations from the baseline consumption level. Ref-
erence dependence is the prerequisite for three additional proper-
ties of v and w that are discussed next: Decreasing absolute
sensitivity, increasing proportional sensitivity, and constant loss
aversion.
Diminishing absolute sensitivity to delays and outcomes.
Diminishing absolute sensitivity has its roots in the Weber–
Fechner law. For constant absolute increases of t and x 	 0, w(t)
and v(x) increase by decreasing absolute amounts. For instance,
adding $1 to $2 yields a greater absolute increase in value than
adding $1 to $200. Similarly, for constant absolute decreases of
x  0, v(x) decreases by decreasing absolute amounts. Diminishing
absolute sensitivity to outcomes is a standard assumption in psy-
chology and economics, and diminishing absolute sensitivity to
delays is also captured by hyperbolic discounting (see Footnote 3).
Diminishing absolute sensitivity produces two preference pat-
terns. The first, which we call the proportional magnitude effect, is
shared with all discounting models: Increasing the magnitude of
both outcomes by the same additive constant changes indifference
into a preference for SS (gains) or for LL (losses).
The second pattern, the common difference effect, is that in-
creasing both delays by the same additive constant changes indif-
Table 6
Inseparability

2(1)  6.81,
p  .01
205 180 25
Superadditivity with
large amounts
188 17 205

2(1)  14.88,
p  .00
161 144 17 No No 150 11 161
44 36 8 Yes Yes 38 6 44
No Yes No Yes
Superadditivity with
small amounts
Subadditivity with large
amounts

2(1)  0.35,
p  .56
No Yes
Subadditivity with
small amounts
No Yes

2(1)  3.43,
p  .06
176 155 21 No No 161 15 176
29 25 4 Yes Yes 27 2 29
205 180 25 188 17 205
Note. McNemar’s chi-square test on the off-diagonals.
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ference into a preference for LL (gains) or for SS (losses). For
gains, we have
QT XwtL  wtS  QXTvxL  vxS and
QT Xwa tL  wa tS  QXTvxL  vxS, so that
QT Xwa tL  wa tS  QT XwtL  wtS, or
wa tL  wa tS  wtL  wtS iff a  0.
By diminishing absolute sensitivity, the additive constant de-
creases the absolute difference between weighted delays and, thus,
decreases the weight of the time attribute.
Augmenting proportional sensitivity to delays and out-
comes. For constant proportional increases of t and x 	 0, w(t)
and v(x) increase by increasing absolute amounts. For instance,
doubling $100 yields a greater absolute increase in value than
doubling $1. Similarly, for constant proportional decreases of x 
0, v(x) decreases by increasing absolute amounts.
As with diminishing absolute sensitivity, augmenting propor-
tional sensitivity produces two preference patterns. The first,
which we call the common ratio effect, is again shared with all
discounting models: Increasing both delays by the same multipli-
cative constant changes indifference into a preference for SS
(gains) or for LL (losses).9
The second pattern, the absolute magnitude effect, is that in-
creasing the magnitude of both outcomes by the same multiplica-
tive constant changes indifference into a preference for LL (gains)
or for SS (losses).10 For gains, we have
QT XwtL  wtS  QXTvxL  vxS and
QT XwtL  wtS  QXTvmxL  vmxS, so that
QXTvmxL  vmxS  QXTvxL  vxS, or
vmxL  vmxS  vxL  vxS iff m 1.
By augmenting proportional sensitivity, the multiplicative constant
increases the absolute difference between outcome values and,
thus, increases the weight of the outcome attribute.
Although the tradeoff model ascribes the absolute magnitude
effect to augmenting proportional sensitivity, the hyperbolic dis-
counting model ascribes it to increasing elasticity: For constant
proportional increases of x 	 0, v(x) increases by increasing
proportional amounts, and, similarly, for constant proportional
decreases of x  0, v(x) decreases by increasing proportional
amounts (increasing elasticity is also captured by Inequality 3).11
This difference between the models is important: In Appendix B,
we prove that, when combined with diminishing absolute sensi-
tivity, augmenting proportional sensitivity is satisfied by a broader
class of value functions than increasing sensitivity. In particular,
the power value function, since long a popular device in formal
analyses of choice (Tversky, 1967b), satisfies the former but not
the latter.
Constant loss aversion. The final property of the value func-
tion is constant loss aversion (Tversky & Kahneman, 1991): Re-
versing the sign of an outcome from positive to negative increases
the magnitude of its value by a multiplicative constant, that is,
v(x)  v(x), where x  0 and  	 1. In the single reference
point model, constant loss aversion produces the gain-loss asym-
metry: The sign reversal changes indifference into a preference for
SS. Formally, we have
QT XwtL  wtS  QXTvxL  vxS and
QT XwtL  wtS  QXTvxS  vxL, so that
QXTvxS  vxL  QXTvxL  vxS, or
vxS  vxL  vxL  vxS.
By constant loss aversion, the multiplicative constant  increases
the absolute difference between outcome values and, thus, in-
creases the weight of the outcome attribute.
Constant loss aversion is the only variant of loss aversion that
dissociates the asymmetric steepness of the value function (Kah-
neman & Tversky, 1979) from asymmetric elasticity (Loewenstein
& Prelec, 1992; asymmetric elasticity is also captured by Inequal-
ity 4). Evidence on risky choice is equivocal on whether the
asymmetry between gains and losses can be fully captured by
constant loss aversion: Some studies suggest it can (e.g., Tversky
& Kahneman, 1992), others that it cannot (e.g., Abdellaoui,
Bleichrodt, & L’Haridon, 2008; Fennema & van Assen, 1999). In
the tradeoff model, a qualitative account of the gain-loss asymme-
try and, as discussed below, the delay-speedup asymmetry can
entirely do without asymmetric elasticity. Drawing on consider-
ations of parsimony, therefore, we only invoke constant loss aver-
sion.
Constant loss aversion concludes our discussion of the intra-
attribute weighing functions w and v, which transform objective
intervals and compensations into effective ones. Thus, by applying
the time-weighing function w, the difference between 4 months
and 1 month may be effectively the same as that between 12
months and 6 months. Similarly, by applying the value function v,
the difference between $150 and $100 may be effectively the same
as that between $1,500 and $1,250, or that between $125 and
$150. The effective intervals must now be weighted against
effective compensations. This is done by the inter-attribute weigh-
ing functions discussed next.
9 The common ratio effect cannot be expected to persist unconditionally:
The difference between 40 and 20 years clearly matters, but the difference
between 400 and 200 years clearly does not, because both delays are
outside human experience. In risky choice, the common ratio effect per-
tains to the probability attribute and is anomalous to the expected utility
model (Prelec & Loewenstein, 1991).
10 Like the common ratio effect, the absolute magnitude effect cannot be
expected to persist unconditionally, as Amos Tversky pointed out to Prelec
and Loewenstein (1991): “Doubling an award of 10 billion dollars clearly
matters less than doubling an award of $500,000; likewise, the difference
between losing one or two million dollars is less important than that
between losing one or two thousand, to most people at least” (Prelec &
Loewenstein, 1991, p. 778).
11 Diminishing absolute sensitivity, augmenting proportional sensitivity,
and increasing elasticity can be given a geometric interpretation. For x 	
0, augmenting absolute sensitivity means that v(x) is a concave function of
x. Augmenting proportional sensitivity means that v(x) is a convex function
of log(x). Increasing elasticity means that log(v(x)) is a convex function of
log(x).
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Inter-attribute sensitivity. The tradeoff function QT|X can be
given as
QT XT  ST if T εT XLT if T εT X, (6.1)
where 0  S  L, and εT|X 	 0 is a threshold. The step
function considered by Tversky (1969) arises when S  0,
producing a lexicographic semi-order. An example of QT|X, as
given by Equation 6.1, is the bipartite function in Figure 3.
Similarly, the tradeoff function QX|T can be given as
QXTX  SX if X εXTLX if X εXT, (6.2)
where 0  S  L, and εX|T 	 0 is a threshold. The scaling
constants S, L, S, and L serve two functions: Scaling effective
intervals and effective compensations to a common currency, and
underweighing sub-threshold effective differences in comparison
with supra-threshold effective differences. If only the relative
magnitude of scaled effective differences is of interest, one of
these scaling constants can be set to unity.
Like the inter-attribute threshold in Gonza´lez-Vallejo’s (2002) sto-
chastic difference model, the intra-attribute thresholds εT|X and εX|T
are affected by “choice context” (Gonza´lez-Vallejo, 2002, p. 137).
Although choice context can include many things, we suggest that it
includes the choice set itself, elsewhere called the “local context”
(Tversky & Simonson, 1993, p. 1185). In line with Rubinstein (2003)
and Leland (2002), who introduced the concept of similarity to
the study of intertemporal choice, we propose that the intra-attribute
thresholds εT|X and εX|T are affected by the relative similarity of the
outcomes and the delays in the local context. If the outcomes are more
similar to one another than the delays, there will be a bias in favor of
SS (gains) or LL (losses), that is, X  εX|T but T  εT|X. Conversely,
if the delays are more similar to one another than the outcomes, there
will be a bias in favor of LL (gains) or SS (losses), that is, T  εT|X
but X  εX|T. Similarity is comparative in nature. Therefore, its role
in intertemporal choice underscores the basic proposition of the
tradeoff model, which is that people make direct comparisons along
both attributes (time and money).
We ascribe the three anomalies to discounting theory identified
earlier (strong subadditivity, strong superadditivity, and insepara-
bility) to biases induced by the effective similarity between the
options along the attributes, as discussed next.
Anomaly 1: Strong subadditivity. With reference to Fig-
ure 1, participants preferred (a, t  1) to (a  b, t), so that, by
diminishing absolute sensitivity to delays (w), diminishing abso-
lute sensitivity to outcomes (v), and transitivity, they should also
have preferred (a, t  2) to (a  2b, t). However, they had the
reverse preference. Our explanation is that, in the context of a 19-
or 22-month wait, $100 was likely to be similar to $118, but, in the
context of a 16- or 22-month wait, $100 was less likely to be
similar to $136. The similarity of the outcomes produces a bias in
favor of SS: An extra wait for a similar amount of money is
unjustified. Without this bias, an extra wait for an extra amount of
money may be justified, and the results show it was.
If there were no bias over the 1-period interval, that is, X εX|T,
then, by diminishing absolute sensitivity to delays, diminishing
absolute sensitivity to outcomes, and transitivity, we would have
Lv136  v100  Lw22  w16 
Lv118  v100  Lw22  w19  0.
That is, if SS is preferred over the 1-period interval, then it should also
be preferred over the 2-period interval. Instead, however, we had
Sv118  v100  Lw22  w19  0 
Lv136  v100  Lw22  w16.
That is, LL was preferred over the 2-period interval, but SS was
preferred over the 1-period interval. Our interpretation is that, over
the 1-period interval, the similarity of the outcomes produced a
bias in favor of SS, that is, X  εX|T, so that the effective
compensation was weighted by S  L, not by L.
Anomaly 2: Strong superadditivity. With reference to Fig-
ure 2, participants preferred (a, t  1) to (a  b, t), so that, by
diminishing absolute sensitivity to delays (w), diminishing abso-
lute sensitivity to outcomes (v), and transitivity, they should also
have preferred (a, t  2) to (a  2b, t). However, they had the
reverse preference. Our explanation is that, the context of a $8,250
or $10,250 payoff, a 12-month wait was likely to be similar to a
24-month wait, but, in the context of a $6,250 or $10,250 payoff,
a 12-month wait was likely to be similar to a 36-month wait. The
similarity of the delays produces a bias in favor of LL: A similar
wait for a much larger amount of money is justified. Without this
bias, much longer waits for much larger amounts of money may
not be justified, and the results show they were not.
If there were no bias over the 1-period interval, that is, T εT|X,
then, by diminishing absolute sensitivity to delays, diminishing
absolute sensitivity to outcomes, and transitivity, we would have
Lv10,250  v6,250  Lw36  w12 
Lv10,250  v8,250  Lw24  w12  0.
eT
T
Q
T|
X(
T)
εT|X
Figure 3. An example of a bipartite and a continuous tradeoff function QT|X.
The bipartite tradeoff function is given as QT XT  ST if T  εT|X and
QT XT  LT if T  εT|X, where 0  S  L, and εT|X 	 0 is a
context-dependent threshold. The continuous tradeoff function is given as
QT XT  /T Xlog1  T XT/T XT X, where T|X 	 0 is subadditivity
and T|X 	 1 is superadditivity. The inflection occurs when T 
T XT X  1/T X1/T X, so that T|X and T|X take on the role of the
context-dependent εT|X in locating the shallower and steeper regions of QT|X.
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That is, if LL is preferred over the 1-period interval, then it should also
be preferred over the 2-period interval. Instead, however, we had
Lv10,250  v8,250  Sw24  w12  0 
Lv10,250  v6,250  Lw36  w12.
That is, SS was preferred over the 2-period interval, but LL was
preferred over the 1-period interval. Our interpretation is that, over
the 1-period interval, the similarity of the delays produced a bias
in favor of LL, that is, T  εT|X, so that the effective interval was
weighted by S  L, not by L.
We suggested that a 12-months wait was similar to a 24-months
wait in the context of significant large payoffs. These same delays
would probably not be similar if the payoffs were reduced by a
factor of 100, to $82.50 and $102.50. Such inter-attribute relativity
is the third, and culminating, anomaly to discounting theory.
Anomaly 3: Inseparability. The tradeoff functions QT|X and
QX|T can give rise to intransitive intertemporal choice. Consider
three pairwise choices between three delayed gains. If a person is
indifferent between SS and MM and indifferent between MM and
LL but prefers LL to SS (subadditivity), we have
LwtM  wtS  SvxM  vxS and
LwtL  wtM  SvxL  vxM, so that
LwtL  wtS  SvxL  vxS, but, instead, we have
LwtL  wtS  LvxL  vxS, so that
S L.
Alternatively, if the person is indifferent between SS and MM and
indifferent between MM and LL but prefers SS to LL (superaddi-
tivity), we have
S L.
Our evidence of inseparability shows that which variant of intransi-
tivity is most likely to occur (subadditivity or superadditivity) depends
on the significance of the payoffs over a given range of intervals.
Superadditivity was more likely with large outcomes, whereas
subadditivity was more likely with small ones. Our explanation is as
follows. With large outcomes, the delays were more similar to one
another than the outcomes. This induced a bias in favor of LL, that is,
S  L, producing superadditivity. Conversely, with small out-
comes, the outcomes were more similar to one another than the
delays. This induced a bias in favor of SS, that is,S  L, producing
subadditivity.
Inter-attribute sensitivity and the role of effective similarity in
shaping inter-attribute sensitivity conclude the exposition of the
single reference point model. We next generalize the tradeoff
model to accommodate the delay-speedup asymmetry.
The Multiple Reference Point Model
In the single reference point model, both outcomes are treated
as deviations from the baseline consumption level, so that gains
and losses coincide with the actual amounts to be received or
paid. However, the reference point of the value function may
not be located at the baseline consumption level. It can be
affected, for instance, by the formulation of the options (Kah-
neman & Tversky, 1979) and by the goals (Heath, Larrick, &
Wu, 1999), aspirations (Payne, Laughhunn, & Crum, 1980,
1981), and expectations (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979) of the
decision maker. We have already discussed how expectations
play a role in Loewenstein and Prelec’s (1992) analysis of the
delay-speedup asymmetry. In their analysis, the reference point
for a given moment includes everything they expect to gain or
lose at that moment. Thus, receiving or paying an amount when
expected is evaluated as a zero event, but not receiving or
paying the amount (in the event of a delay or speedup) is
evaluated as a loss or gain (see also Shelley, 1993).
In Loewenstein and Prelec’s (1992) analysis, the reference
point moves to the expected consumption level, meaning that
people treat a compensated change from that level (compen-
sated by a change from the baseline consumption level at
another moment) exactly as they would treat an uncompensated
change. It is unlikely, however, that someone who does not
receive an expected $100 today, knowing that he or she is to
receive $150 in 3 months, will treat the foregone $100 exactly
as he or she would if it was uncompensated. We suggest that
people do not treat compensated and uncompensated changes
from the expected consumption level in the same way, and that
the presence of a compensation moderates the degree to which
the reference point changes. That is, the effective reference
point is likely to be intermediate between the expected con-
sumption level (including the expected $100) and the baseline
consumption level. This proposal of incomplete adaptation is in
agreement with Hoch and Loewenstein (1991); Strahilevitz and
Loewenstein (1998); and Arkes, Hirshleifer, Jiang, and Lim
(2008), who all discuss it in contexts other than the delay or
speedup of consumption. We next develop a version of the
tradeoff model with incomplete adaptation to expected out-
comes.
In the single reference point model, the value of receiving x is
v(x) and the value of not receiving it is v(0), so that the value
difference between receiving and not receiving x is v(x)  v(0) 
v(x). This is no longer the case if one adapts to receiving x. In the
case of complete adaptation, the value of receiving x is v(0) and the
value of not receiving it is v(x), so that the value difference
between receiving and not receiving x is v(0)  v(x)  v(x).
In general, however, the degree of adaptation, as indicated by
reference-point shift r, will fall somewhere on the continuum
between no adaptation, that is, r  0, and complete adaptation, that
is, r  x. The value of receiving x is then v(x  r) and the value
of not receiving it is v(r), so that the value difference between
receiving and foregoing x is v(x  r)  v(r). This expression,
which also appears in Hoch and Loewenstein’s (1991) analysis of
impatience, serves to generalize the tradeoff model.
To accommodate the delay-speedup asymmetry, we propose
that an expected outcome is evaluated relative to a reference point
that has moved away from the baseline consumption level (adap-
tation), whereas the outcome that compensates for the delay or
speedup of the expected outcome continues to be evaluated rela-
tive to the baseline consumption level. The decision maker will
then be indifferent between SS and LL when
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QT XT  
QXT vxˆL  vxS rS  vrS if rS, xS, xˆL 0 delaying a gain
QXTvxˆS  vxL rL  vrL if rL, xˆS, xL 0 speeding up a loss
QXTvxL rL  vrL  vxˆS if rL, xˆS, xL 0 speeding up a gain
QXTvxS rS  vrS  vxˆL if rS, xS, xˆL 0 delaying a loss,
(7)
where xˆL and xˆS are the outcomes that compensate, respectively, for
the delay and speedup of the expected outcome. If there is no
adaptation to the expected outcome, that is, rS  rL  0, the
multiple reference point model in Equation 7 reduces to the single
reference point model in Equation 5. Under the assumption of
constant sensitivity, as customarily invoked in formal analyses of
the delay-speedup asymmetry (Loewenstein, 1988; Shelley, 1993),
Equation 7 becomes
LtL tS  
LxˆL xS rS  rS if rS, xS, xˆL 0 delaying a gain
LxˆS xL rL  rL if rL, xˆS, xL 0 speeding up a loss
LxL rL  rL  xˆS if rL, xˆS, xL 0 speeding up a gain
LxS rS  rS  xˆL if rS, xS, xˆL 0 delaying a loss.
Rearranging,
tL tS  
xˆL xS    1rS if rS, xS, xˆL 0 delaying a gain 8.1
xˆS xL    1rL if rL, xˆS, xL 0 speeding up a loss 8.2
xL xˆS    1rL if rL, xˆS, xL 0 speeding up a gain 8.3
xS xˆL    1rS if rS, xS, xˆL 0 delaying a loss, 8.4
where   L/L. The compensation that one demands for
delaying a gain or speeding up a loss, or that one offers for
speeding up a gain or delaying a loss, can therefore be divided into
a compensation that would be acceptable whether there were no
adaptation and a compensation for adaptation. To derive the delay-
speedup asymmetry for gains, we solve Equation 8.1 for the later
outcome that compensates for the delay of the earlier one,
xˆL tL tS  xS   1rS,
and we solve Equation 8.3 for the earlier outcome that compen-
sates for the speedup of the later one,
xˆS xL   1rL tL tS.
Setting the outcome to be sped up, xL, equal to the outcome that
compensates for the delay, xˆL, and simplifying, we get
xˆS xS   1rS rL.12
It is evident that xˆS  xS as long as there is adaptation and loss
aversion. In the same way, the delay-speedup asymmetry for losses
can be derived from Equations 8.2 and 8.4.
The multiple reference point model introduces two improve-
ments over current discounting models. The first, which can be
introduced to discounting models as well, is that it allows for any
degree of adaptation to an expected outcome. The second improve-
ment, however, is a genuine strength of the tradeoff model. The
hyperbolic discounting model ascribes the delay-speedup asym-
metry to the value function being steeper in losses than in gains
(loss aversion) but the gain-loss asymmetry to the value function
being more elastic in losses than in gains: Two different devices
for two similar phenomena (see Footnote 7). The tradeoff model
ascribes both anomalies to loss aversion. The degree of adaptation
to the expected outcome determines the degree to which the
delay-speedup asymmetry outweighs the gain-loss asymmetry.
The tradeoff model thus offers a parsimonious and psychologically
plausible explanation of these two similar phenomena.
The multiple reference point model concludes the qualitative
development of the tradeoff model. In the next section, we develop
a fully parametric specification of the model.
Putting Tradeoffs to Work
In this section, we provide the parametric specification of the
value function and the time-weighing function. The tradeoff func-
tions are given by Equations 6.1 and 6.2, but, as we mention in the
General Discussion section, they may, under certain conditions, be
replaced by a single, continuous tradeoff function.
The Value Function
The qualitative development of the tradeoff model is consistent
with a broad range of value functions. However, the range of
possible value functions can be narrowed by broadening the set of
qualitative requirements that the value function must satisfy. Con-
sidering six qualitative requirements, we propose the following
value function:
12 Adaptation imposes a constraint on the magnitude of the loss-aversion
coefficient, . Because the equations have to satisfy xˆS  xL, the multiple
reference point model implies that, in the extreme case of complete
adaptation to expected outcomes, xS  xL (2  )/. Thus, we have 1 
  2. In the case of incomplete adaptation, the constraint is relaxed, and
in the case of no adaptation, the constraint is removed.
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vx  
1

log1   x if x 0



log1  x if x 0,
(9)
where  	 1 is constant loss aversion and  	 0 is diminishing
absolute sensitivity to outcomes. The six qualitative requirements
that this value function satisfies are discussed below for the case of
indifference between xS at tS and xL at tL. Unless stated otherwise,
the exposition concerns the case of gains (xS, xL 	 0).
1. To maintain indifference, the absolute compensation xL  xS
is larger for a longer tL. This requires that v be an increasing
function.
2. The absolute compensation xL  xS is larger for a larger xS.
This is the proportional magnitude effect and requires that v be a
reference-dependent function satisfying diminishing absolute sen-
sitivity.
3. The proportional compensation (xL  xS)/xS is smaller for a
larger xS. This is the absolute magnitude effect, and requires that v
be a reference-dependent function satisfying augmenting propor-
tional sensitivity.13
4. The absolute compensation xL  xS for xS, xL 	 0 (gains) is
larger than the absolute compensation xS  xL for xS, xL  0
(losses). This is the gain-loss asymmetry, and requires that v be a
reference-dependent function satisfying constant loss aversion.
5. The compensations implied by the value function are bounded
by two extremes, constant compensation and proportional com-
pensation. Constant compensation occurs when the absolute com-
pensation xL  xS and the magnitude of xS are independent. For
instance, xL  xS  $10 regardless of whether xS is $100 or $900.
Proportional compensation occurs when the proportional compen-
sation (xL  xS)/xS and the magnitude of xS are independent. For
instance, xL  xS  $10 when xS is $100, but xL  xS  $90 when
xS is $900, so that (xL  xS)/xS  .10. In the case of constant
compensation, there would be no proportional magnitude effect
and a maximum absolute magnitude effect; in the case of propor-
tional compensation, there would be no absolute magnitude effect
and a maximum proportional magnitude effect.
The value function in Equation 9 implies constant compensation
as  approaches 0 and proportional compensation as  approaches
infinity. When  goes toward 0, the value function approaches
constant sensitivity, in which case value increases linearly with
outcome, that is, v(x)  x if x  0 and v(x)  x if x  0. When
 goes toward infinity, the value function approaches insensitivity,
in which case any outcome is treated as if it had no value at all, that
is, v(x)  0 for any x. These are limiting cases, however, meaning
that constant and proportional compensation will never really
exist.
6. The present value of xL increases with the magnitude of xL,
but increases more steeply for a shorter tL (Stevenson, 1986, 1992,
1993; see also Anderson & Shanteau, 1970; Shanteau, 1974;
Tversky, 1967a, 1967b). That is, if we plot xS as a function of xL
for different delays tL, we get a diverging fan of lines, with a
steeper slope corresponding to a shorter tL. This is shown in Figure
4. These bilinear interaction effects, as they are called, impose
severe constraints on the value function of the tradeoff model,
because the present value is given as
xS  v1vxL  QXT1QT XwtL if xL xS 0v1vxL  QXT1QT XwtL if 0  xS xL.
The subtraction or addition of v(xS) and QXT1QT XwtL will not
produce the diverging fan of lines in xSxL space unless v1 is an
exponential function, which means that v itself must be a logarith-
mic function, as the one in Equation 9.14 The diverging fan of lines
in Figure 4 was drawn with   0.15 and all other functions (QX|T,
QT|X, and w) set to identity.
The value function in Equation 9 also exhibits decreasing elas-
ticity. In the tradeoff model, however, a qualitative account of the
anomalies can entirely do without decreasing elasticity.
The Time-Weighing Function
The time-weighing function is an adaptation of the value func-
tion to the weighing of delays:
13 An example of a value function that does not satisfy this requirement
is the double logarithmic value function
vx  
e

logloge x if x 0
 
e

logloge x if x 0.
We owe this example to Craig Desjardins.
14 An example of a value function that does not satisfy this requirement
is the power value function
vx  
1
1   x
1
1 if x 0


1  x
1
1 if x 0.
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Figure 4. Bilinear interaction effects: The present value xS of a delayed
outcome xL increases with the magnitude of the delayed outcome xL, but it
increases more steeply for a shorter delay tL.
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wt 
1

log1   t, (10)
where  	 0 is diminishing absolute sensitivity to delays. Dimin-
ishing absolute sensitivity is bounded by constant sensitivity, when
 approaches 0, and insensitivity, as  approaches infinity. This
time-weighing function is consistent with the functional form of
discounting theory: Loewenstein and Prelec’s (1992) hyperbolic
discount function dt  1  t/ can be derived by
combining w(t) with exponential discounting over weighted rather
than stated delays, that is, dt  ewt.
Logarithmic specifications of w have recently been proposed by
other authors as well. Takanishi (2005) proposes w(t)   log(1 
t), which reduces to Equation 10 when   1/, and to w(t) 
log(1  t), proposed by Zauberman et al. (2009), when    
1. These other authors, however, refer to w as a time-perception
function rather than a time-weighing function. This is not just
terminology: Time percepts are subjective, whereas time weights,
like probability weights in prospect theory, are neither subjective
nor objective. They are not objective, because twice a delay will
generally not receive twice the decision weight. Nor are they
subjective, because twice a delay may be perceived as twice as
long, especially when the delay is stated rather than experienced,
and yet receive less than twice the decision weight.
General Discussion
Discounting theory can accommodate many anomalies to Sam-
uelson’s (1937) discounted utility model, the normative standard
for intertemporal choice. However, we identified three anomalies
that it cannot accommodate. These are strong subadditivity, strong
superadditivity, and inseparability. To account for these anomalies,
we developed the tradeoff model of intertemporal choice. The
tradeoff model is a drastic departure from discounting theory. It
relinquishes the idea that people make intertemporal choices by
comparing the discounted values of available options. According
to the tradeoff model, people make intertemporal choices by
weighing how much more they will receive or pay if they wait
longer against how much longer the wait will be, or, conversely,
how much less they will receive or pay if they do not wait longer
against how much shorter the wait will be. The tradeoff model
offers a parsimonious and psychologically plausible explanation of
all anomalies that discounting theory can and cannot address. In
this General Discussion section, we further strengthen our case for
the tradeoff model by focusing on two of its main features:
attribute-based choice and context dependence.
The tradeoff model has as its closest relatives the additive
difference model proposed by Tversky (1969) and the stochastic
difference model proposed by Gonza´lez-Vallejo and colleagues
(Gonza´lez-Vallejo, 2002; Gonza´lez-Vallejo, Bonazzi, & Shapiro,
1996; Gonza´lez-Vallejo & Reid, 2006; Gonza´lez-Vallejo, Reid, &
Schiltz, 2003). Both the tradeoff model and the stochastic differ-
ence model can be viewed as refinements of the additive difference
model. However, they describe the inter-attribute weighing pro-
cess in different ways, and this difference is important for the
modeling of intertemporal choice.
In the tradeoff model, the absolute difference between valued
outcomes is weighted against the absolute difference between
weighted delays. In the stochastic difference model, when applied
to tradeoffs between time and money, the proportional difference
between valued outcomes is weighted against the proportional
difference between weighted delays. The weighing of proportional
differences obviates the need for one tradeoff parameter (to scale
effective intervals and effective compensations into a common
currency). However, it does not eliminate the need for an increas-
ingly elastic value function (to accommodate the absolute magni-
tude effect), and it creates the need for an increasingly elastic
time-weighing function (to accommodate the common ratio ef-
fect). By weighing absolute differences, as in the tradeoff model,
these problems are immediately resolved.
Whereas the stochastic difference model weighs proportional dif-
ferences, and the tradeoff model weighs absolute differences, the
interval discounting model—the only formulation of discounting the-
ory that accommodates subadditivity and superadditivity—weighs
absolute differences along the time attribute against proportional
differences along the money attribute. If we neutralize all possible
parameters of the stochastic difference model, the interval discounting
model, and the tradeoff model, respectively, the decision maker will
be indifferent between SS and LL when
tL tS
tS

xL xS
xS
, or
tS
tL

xS
xL
stochastic difference model ,
1
1  tL tS

xS
xL
, or
tL tS 
xL xS
xS
interval discounting model , and
tL tS   xL xS if xL xS 0xS xL if 0  xS xL tradeoff model .
Thus, the successive formulations involve a progressive elimina-
tion of proportionality from the inter-attribute weighing process.
The tradeoff functions given by Equations 6.1 and 6.2 are
bipartite functions, linear below the threshold and linear above it.
The implication is additivity in the absence of threshold effects.
This may be an oversimplification: There is evidence of subaddi-
tivity in the absence of any apparent thresholds effects (Read,
2001; Read & Roelofsma, 2003; Scholten & Read, 2006; Zauber-
man et al., 2009). This may be an indication that the tradeoff
functions are S-shaped—convex over small effective differences
(superadditivity) but concave over larger ones (subadditivity)—
and that the S-shaped curve over longer effective intervals is
shallower than the S-shaped curve over larger effective compen-
sations (subadditivity in intervals). If, in addition, the S-shaped
curve over short effective intervals is steeper than the S-shaped
curve over small effective compensations (superadditivity in in-
tervals), the tradeoff process can be described by a single S-shaped
tradeoff function QT|X (for an example of such a function, see
Figure 3):
QT XwtL  wtS   vxL  vxS if xL xS 0,vxS  vxL if 0  xS xL.
This is the attribute-based analogue of the partly-alternative-
partly-attribute-based interval discounting model. Although both
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models capture subadditivity, they do not really explain it: The
origin of subadditivity deserves closer examination.
An S-shaped tradeoff function QT|X can also capture what Ebert
and Prelec (2007) called time sensitivity. Greater time sensitivity
consists in less discounting of near-future outcomes and more
discounting of far-future ones. Ebert and Prelec’s studies, in which
the effect of the delay to the later outcome was confounded with
that of the interval between the outcomes (see Footnote 2), show
that time sensitivity can be affected by the experimental context.
For instance, unlimited deliberation time leads to greater time
sensitivity than limited deliberation time, and a within-subject
design leads to greater time sensitivity than a between-subjects
design. If we invoke the S-shaped tradeoff function QT|X to deal
with this evidence, greater time sensitivity corresponds to a more
pronounced superadditivity and/or a less pronounced subadditivity
(see the caption to Figure 3). This interpretation ties in with the
evidence from one of our own studies (Scholten & Read, 2006,
Experiment 2): Using a within-subject design, we observed a
succession of superadditivity and subadditivity over intervals of
increasing length. The nature and origin of time sensitivity, and its
context dependence, deserves closer examination as well.
The experimental context also influences the overall level of
discounting (for an earlier discussion, see Frederick et al., 2002).
Consider, for instance, a choice-based matching procedure, in
which one aspect (usually the outcome) of one option is repeatedly
adjusted, and the point of indifference between SS and LL is
inferred from the participant’s choices. (At the indifference point,
the options are “matched” on preference.) A series of recent
studies show that adjusting xS in ascending order yields a higher
level of discounting than adjusting it in descending order (Robles
& Vargas, 2007, 2008; Robles, Vargas, & Bejarano, 2009).15 A
datum like this may prompt two legitimate, and perhaps not
mutually exclusive, reactions.
One is to consider the direction in which x is adjusted as
“theoretically irrelevant” (Frederick et al., 2002, p. 384) and to
work out methodological solutions. For instance, one might take
the average of the two indifference points as a best guess of the
true indifference point (e.g., Green, Fry, & Myerson, 1994). Also,
one might use other matching procedures, for example, one in
which x is adjusted in a random order (e.g., Robles & Vargas,
2007) or one in which x is adjusted up and down as a function of
the participant’s choices (a titration procedure; e.g., Read, 2001),
and see whether these procedures yield similar levels of discount-
ing.
The second reaction is to take the effect of the direction in which
x is adjusted as something that requires a theoretical explanation.
In Robles and Vargas’s (2007, 2008) experiments, the starting
point of the adjustment process was different. On the first trial of
the descending procedure, xS was equal to xL, and, on subsequent
trials, began deteriorating; on the first trial of the ascending pro-
cedure, xS was close to 0, and, on subsequent trials, began improv-
ing. The descending procedure may have emphasized that one is
foregoing xL in exchange for xS, that is, that one is speeding up a
gain. In the terminology of the tradeoff model, the amount of xS at
the indifference point, denoted xˆS, would be given by
QT XT  QXTvxL rL vrL  vxˆS.
For the ascending procedure, on the other hand, the indifference
point would be given by
QT XT  QXTvxL  vxˆS.
Comparing the two procedures, adaptation and loss aversion would
drive up xˆS from the descending procedure, and thus reduce dis-
counting. In this way, Roble and Vargas’s finding fits neatly into
the tradeoff model, without the need to invoke biases such as
anchoring or indeed any errors on the part of the decision makers.
Attribute-based models are a departure from alternative-based
models and models that combine alternative-wise valuation with
attribute-wise comparisons. A prominent instance of the latter
approach is Mellers and Biagini’s (1994) contrast-weighing the-
ory. When applying this theory to tradeoffs between time and
money, a discounted value V is assigned to each option but, in
computing the discounted value, the outcome values receive a
contrast weight that is inversely related to the absolute difference
between the delays to the outcomes, and the discount factors
receive a contrast weight that is inversely related to the absolute
difference between the outcomes. Letting wt(tL  tS) and wx(xL 
xS) be the contrast weights for outcome values and discount
factors, respectively, the decision maker will be indifferent be-
tween SS and LL when
  itS1tL iwxxLxS   vxSvxL
wttLtS
.
Contrast-weighing theory does not need increasing elasticity to
accommodate the absolute magnitude effect: Increasing both out-
comes by the same multiplicative constant increases the absolute
difference between the outcomes and therefore decreases the con-
trast weight for the discount factors, so that
  itS1tL iwxmxLmxS   vmxSvmxL
wttLtS
iff m 	 1.
However, contrast-weighing theory cannot, without revision, avoid
invoking asymmetric elasticity to accommodate the gain-loss
asymmetry. Specifically, it must assume that the contrast weights
are inversely related to effective, rather than objective, differences
along the attributes: Loss aversion increases the effective differ-
ence along the outcome attribute and therefore decreases the
contrast weight for the discount factors. This revision, however,
severely complicates the analysis of the delay-speedup asymmetry,
in that reference-point shifts have an impact not only on the
outcome values but also on the contrast weight for the discount
factors. In sum, for the modeling of intertemporal choice, contrast-
weighing theory raises as many problems as it resolves.
Even so, contrast-weighing theory is able to predict a classic
preference pattern, and the tradeoff model must be able to predict
it as well. This is the comparability effect (see Busemeyer, Jessup,
& Dimperio, 2007), an idealized version of which is given in
Figure 5. The effect occurs when choosing between one standard
option with a constant outcome and delay and another variable
option with a variable outcome and delay. The curve relating the
outcome of the variable option to the probability of choosing it is
15 In Robles and Vargas’s (2008) study, the difference between the two
matching procedures persisted when they did not terminate at the indiffer-
ence point but continued until a preestablished number of adjustments was
reached.
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steeper when the delays of both options are the same than when
they are different. Mellers and Biagini (1994) proposed that the
similarity or comparability of the options along one attribute
enhances the difference between them along the other. This is, in
their theory, captured by the contrast weights.
To show how the tradeoff model accommodates the compara-
bility effect, we use the ratio rule to obtain the probability of
choosing LL, SS, and, in case the options are identical, EE, where
E denotes equal outcomes and equal delays, respectively:
PLL
g
g f , PSS
f
g f , and PEE  1/2.
16
Similarly, choice probabilities can be obtained in case one option
dominates the other. For instance, the probabilities of choosing EL
and ES, that is, a later outcome and a sooner outcome of equal
magnitude, are
PEL
0
0  f 0 and PES
f
0  f 1.
Using this specification of the choice rule, the comparability effect
can be reconstructed as in Figure 6. The probabilities of choosing
the variable option over the standard option are either moderate or
extreme. Moderate probabilities occur when the options are iden-
tical or when they imply a tradeoff, whereas extreme probabilities
occur when the variable option dominates, or is dominated by, the
standard option. Thus, the tradeoff model explains the compara-
bility effect by correctly distinguishing between dominance and
nondominance situations.
In the above reconstruction of the comparability effect, we used
a ratio rule to obtain choice probabilities. Although we do not
commit ourselves to the ratio rule, we do commit ourselves to the
other components of the tradeoff model that are needed in practice
to obtain choice probabilities: The tradeoff functions in Equations
6.1 and 6.2 (but see the foregoing discussion of continuous
tradeoff functions), the value function in Equation 9, and the
time-weighing function in Equation 10. Our specification of the
value function is a novelty in the formal analysis of choice. We
must emphasize, however, that the value function emerged from
six qualitative requirements within the theoretical structure of the
tradeoff model. What is best for the tradeoff model may not be as
good for choice models with a different structure. Even so, our
value function deserves careful consideration. As mentioned ear-
lier, our value function exhibits decreasing elasticity. Elsewhere
(Scholten & Read, 2010), we show that this property can help to
explain a well-known anomaly to the expected utility model: A
change from risk seeking in small gains to risk aversion in larger
gains, and, conversely, a change from risk aversion in small losses
to risk seeking in larger losses (Markowitz, 1952). We show that
prospect theory can only account for this anomaly if it adopts a
decreasingly elastic value function.
One of the six qualitative requirements was that the tradeoff
model would accommodate bilinear interaction effects: The
present value of a delayed outcome increases with the magnitude
of the outcome but increases more steeply the shorter the delay to
the outcome (see Figure 4). Bilinear interaction effects are often
taken as evidence for multiplicative, alternative-based choice mod-
els, but, as our development shows, it can just as well be taken as
evidence for an attribute-based choice model in which diminishing
sensitivity to attribute amounts is captured by logarithmic func-
tions.
Concluding Comments
Even though we propose the tradeoff model as an alternative to
discounting theory, we have no disagreement with the computation
of net present values in finance and economics or with any other
normative application of discounting theory. Discounting theory is
normatively compelling and, when equipped with a table of inter-
est rates and a spreadsheet, easy to apply. The problems arise,
however, with descriptive or even prescriptive applications.
Suppose you, a consultant, want to take a client’s sensitivity to
ratios between delays into consideration (the common difference
effect). This can easily be incorporated into your toolkit: Just
replace exponential discounting by hyperbolic discounting. How-
ever, suppose you also want to take your client’s sensitivity to
differences between outcomes into consideration (the absolute
magnitude effect). Incorporating this into your toolkit will, because
of the burden it places on the value function of a discounting
model (see Appendix B), immediately create a convoluted and
clumsy device, which may be impossible to apply.
Our recommendation: “Drop your tools” (Weick, 1996). View
your client as someone who is trading off differences between
outcomes against differences between delays. While you conduct
your tradeoff analysis, remember the Weber–Fechner law, so as to
take your client’s sense of proportionality into consideration. You
will find that this device is easy to apply and that it is an accurate
reflection of your client’s preferences.
16 The advantages could be exponentiated in order to capture the error in
choice behavior.
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Figure 5. The comparability effect (cf. Mellers & Biagini, 1994, Fig-
ure 5, Panel B): The curve relating the outcome of the variable option to the
probability of choosing it is steeper when the delays of both options are the
same than when they are different.
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Appendix A
Strong Subadditivity
Consider the case in which a person prefers (a, t  1) to (a 
b, t) but (a  kb, t) to (a, t  k), where the first element of each
option is money, and the second element is time. We will prove
that this is incompatible with hyperbolic or exponential discount-
ing and diminishing or constant sensitivity to outcomes: A person
who prefers (a, t  1) to (a  b, t) should also prefer (a, t  k) and
(a  kb, t). We owe this proof to Ana Rita Pires.
Given the following conditions:
a, b  0, (A1)
v0  0, vx  0 for x 0, vx  0, and vx  0,
(A2)
0   tk tk1  . . .  t1  t 1, where k  t, and
(A3)
 i1t iva b  i1t1iva  0, or
 t
va
va b, (A4)
we want to prove that
 i1t iva kb  i1tkiva  0, or
 itk1t i vava kb.
Given Condition A3, it is sufficient to prove that
 t
k
va
va kb.
Let V(x)  log v(x). Condition A2 implies
Vx 
vx
vx
 0, and
Vx 
vxvx  vx2
vx2
 0. (A5)
Because vx  eVx, Condition A4 becomes
eVaVab  t, or
Va  Va b  logt,
and what we want to prove becomes
eVaVakb  t
k
, or
Va  Va kb  k logt, or
Va  Va kb
k  log t.
Given Condition A5, we have
Va  Va kb
k  Va  Va b,
which completes the proof.
(Appendices continue)
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Appendix B
Augmenting Proportional Sensitivity Versus Increasing Elasticity
We will prove that, when combined with diminishing absolute
sensitivity, augmenting proportional sensitivity is satisfied by a
broader class of value functions than increasing sensitivity. We
give the proof for the case of gains; a parallel proof for the case of
losses is straightforward.
In the tradeoff model, the absolute magnitude effect occurs
because
vmbx  vmx  vbx  vx,
where m, b 	 1 and x 	 0. Thus, Hx  vbx  vx increases
in x. That is, Hx  0,
vbxb vx  0,
bxvbx  xvx.
Thus, hx  xvx increases in x (augmenting proportional
sensitivity), meaning that hx  0,
vx  xvx  0,
vx  
vx
x
. (B1)
In a discounting model, the absolute magnitude effect occurs
because
vmbx
vmx

vbx
vx
.
Thus, Hx  vbx/vx increases in x. That is, Hx  0,
vbxbvx  vbxvx
vx2
 0,
vbxbvx  vbxvx  0,
bx
vbx
vbx  x
vx
vx
.
Thus, hx  xvx/vx increases in x (increasing elasticity),
meaning that hx  0,
xvxvx  xvxvx
vx2
 0,
vx  xvxvx  xvx2  0,
vx  xvxvx  1	vxx . (B2)
Because x, vx, vx  0 but vx  0 (diminishing absolute
sensitivity), Inequality B1 is satisfied by a broader class of value
functions than Inequality B2, which completes the proof.
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